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Abstract
The Revenue Rule, a common law rule from British court
systems, prevents foreign countries from bringing claims in the
United States to enforce or adjudicate tax claims that did not
happen in the United States. The United States Supreme Court in
Pasquantino v. United States held that Canada’s right to collect
imported liquor taxes was not barred by the Revenue Rule.
However, the Second Circuit in European Community v. RJR
Nabisco Inc., ruled the European Union and Colombia could not
recover lost tax money or enforcement costs from cigarette
smuggling under RICO because of the Revenue Rule.
European Community petitioned the Supreme Court.

The
After

accepting the Community’s petition, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case back to the Second Circuit to be reheard in
light of Pasquantino. The Second Circuit did not change its ruling
citing Pasquantino as a criminal case brought by the U.S.
government. With no distinction between criminal and civil RICO
cases in current jurisdiction, this comment seeks to provide a
solution to the split between the Second Circuit and the Supreme
Court. This comment argues in favor of limitations being placed
on the Revenue Rule so that it can never trump RICO claims in
United States courts. In the alternative it argues if limitations
cannot be placed upon the Revenue Rule then the only option is
abolition. Lastly this comment provides that if limitations and
abolition are not the answer, then foreign countries should appeal
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to the United States government to bring the RICO claims on their
behalf.

Introduction
“[W]ith liberty and justice for all.”1 But does all just mean
for Americans? What about other countries? Do they not have the
right to seek justice within the borders of the United States? If a
person smuggles tobacco, liquor, or drugs on American soil, they
are punished through American court systems.

What if an

American citizen or company does the same in another country?
The Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) allows foreign countries to bring suit in America for illegal
acts committed by American citizens.2 Unfortunately for these
foreign countries, a common law rule3 denies them the remedies
they seek.4 The Revenue Rule bars foreign RICO claims because
of an almost 300 year old common law doctrine5 which states that
“no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another.”6
This is an injustice on the part of American justice systems by
denying the enforcement of a federally mandated statute to
accommodate a common law ruling which has yet to be codified in
any way.
1

4 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West 2002) (emphasis added).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1965 (West 1970).
3
Brenda Mallinak, The Revenue Rule: A Common Law Doctrine for the TwentyFirst Century, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L 79, (2006).
4
Id. at 83.
5
Id. at 79. First appearance of the rule is Att’y Gen. v. Lutwydge, 145 Eng.
Rep. 674 (Ex. Div. 1729) Id. at 80.
6
Id. at 81 (citing Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775)).
2
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This Comment will give a brief background on the
Revenue Rule as well as the RICO act and how the two have
interacted in the legal community. This Comment will then argue
that the Revenue Rule should be limited in scope so that it no
longer bars any RICO claims brought by foreign countries. This
limitation can be accomplished in two ways: (1) Never allowing
the Revenue Rule to trump RICO claims or (2) Completely
abolishing the Revenue Rule and allowing America to interpret
foreign countries’ tax laws.

In the alternative, this Comment

argues that if the Revenue Rule cannot be restricted, (3) foreign
countries should appeal to the United States government to bring
these claims on their behalf.
I. Background
A. The Revenue Rule
The Revenue Rule was first adopted in eighteenth century
British courts.7 Since then it has grown and developed into a
method for “courts to decline to entertain[] suits or enforce[e]
foreign tax judgments or foreign revenue laws.”8 A 1729 case is
the earliest sighting of the Revenue Rule.9 Following that case,
Holman v. Johnson10 brought about Lord Mansfield’s famous
statement, “[N]o country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of
another.”11 The series of early Revenue Rule cases all supported

7

Id. at 79.
Id.
9
Id. at 80 (citing Att’y Gen. v. Lutwydge, 145 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ex. Div. 1729)).
10
98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B 1775).
11
Mallinak, supra note 3, at 81.
8
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the premises that one nation does not take notice of the revenue
laws of another12, but these cases provided no rationale for the
decisions of the court.

These cases dealt with smuggled tea,

illegally exported gold, and false shipping documents. With the
recent rise of alcohol and cigarette smuggling, these cases are
particularly interesting in United States courts when foreign
countries bring criminal and civil actions only to have the Revenue
Rule used as a defense.13
The United States first considered the Revenue Rule in
1806 with the Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer14 case.15 The Revenue
Rule mostly appeared in disputes where “individual states sought
enforcement of tax levies against sister states.”16

12

Moore v.

See generally Lutwydge, 145 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ex. Div. 1729), Bourcher v.
Lawson, 95 Eng. Rep. 55 (K.B. 1734), Holman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775),
Planche v. Fletcher, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (K.B. 1779).
13
Mallinak, supra note 3 at 83.
14
1 Johns. 93 (N.Y. 1806). In this case, Ludlow sought enforcement of a
promissory note issued by Van Rensselaer. Malllinak, supra note 3, at 83.
Though the note was issued in Paris and did not bear the stamp required by
French law, “Van Rensselaer resided in New York, and the note was to be paid
in New York.” Id. The Court ruled in favor of Ludlow. Ludlow, 1 Johns. at 96.
15
Mallinak, supra note 3, at 83. The New York Supreme Court relied on
Holman v. Johnson and held “we do not sit here to enforce the revenue laws of
another country, it is perfectly immaterial, in a suit before us, whether or not the
note was stamped according to the laws of France.” Id. at 83-84 (citing Ludlow
v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. 93, 95 (N.Y. 1806)). The New York court did not
allow Rensselaer to default on the note “based on a defense that a foreign
revenue provision was violated.” Id. at 84.
16
Id. States “generally were reluctant to involve themselves in the enforcement
or evaluation of sister state tax laws.” Id. The New York court held “it is a
principle universally recognized that the revenue laws of one country have no
force in another” when “Maryland and the City of Baltimore sought
enforcement of a judgment entered by the highest court in Maryland from a New
York resident.” Id.
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Mitchell17 involved Moore, a treasurer in Indiana, bringing a suit in
New York “to recover taxes alleged to be due and unpaid . . .”
against the “executors of the last will and testament of Richard
Edwards Breed, who allegedly resided in [Indiana].”18

Judge

Manton dismissed the action citing the Revenue Rule.19
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, courts today
interpret and recognize the Revenue Rule as a means to decline
jurisdiction over cases brought by foreign governments without an
agreement between that country and the United States. This led to
the Revenue Rule being recently used as a defense in foreign
RICO cases.20
B. RICO
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
was enacted in 1970.21 It outlaws a list of racketeering activities
that includes: financial institution fraud, fraud in foreign labor
contracting, interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion, and
trafficking in contraband cigarettes.22 It originally limited civil

17

30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929).
Mallinak, supra note 3, at 85 (citing Moore, 30 F.2d at 601 (2d Cir. 1929)).
19
Id. An “effort by Indiana to collect taxes in New York [is] ‘repugnant to the
settled principles of private international law, which preclude one state from
acting as a collector of taxes for a sister state, and from enforcing its penal or
revenue laws as such. The revenue laws of one state have no force in another.”
Id. (citing Moore, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929)).
20
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005); Att'y Gen. of Canada v.
R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001); European Community v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d. 123 (2d Cir. 2004); European Community v. RJR
Nabisco, 424 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2005).
21
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (2013) (Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970).
22
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(b) (2013).
18
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remedies in the first proposed Senate bill,23 “but the House added a
treble-damages remedy modeled on section 4 of the Clayton
Act.”24 Since the 1970’s, the law has changed to the current law,
updated as recently as March 2013.25
RICO brings a criminal punishment of a fine and/or twenty
years to life in prison depending on the severity of the crime.26
Under civil remedies, a person convicted of RICO crimes can be
divested of any interest in any enterprise and a restriction on any
“future activities or investments of any person including . . .
prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor
as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate
or foreign commerce . . . .”27 A plaintiff must show he was injured
by a criminal RICO violation. To show a violation occurred, the
plaintiff must identify the previous commission of a crime
specified in the RICO statute.28 There are also certain defined
terms that must exist to bring a civil RICO claim.29 RICO claims
must be brought before any district court in the United States “in

23

GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 3 (3rd ed. 2010)
(citing S. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)).
24
Id. (citing H.R. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 35, 363-64
(1970)).
25
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (2013).
26
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (2009).
27
18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(a) (1995).
28
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (2013) (defining racketeering activity).
29
Randy D. Gordon, Clarity and Confusion: RICO’s Recent Trips to the United
States Supreme Court, 85 TUL. L. REV. 677, 679 (2011). These terms are listed
in § 1963 of the act and defined in § 1961.
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which [the defendant] resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts
his affairs.”30
The implication of RICO cases brought by foreign
countries has been a point of contention in United States courts
recently.31 Cases have been brought before the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court by foreign
countries seeking remedies under RICO. Most of these cases deal
with the smuggling of cigarettes or alcohol. Because these suits
are being brought by foreign governments, the courts are being
forced to consider RICO and how it interacts with the Revenue
Rule.
C. A Tango Between Titans
1. Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings,
Inc.
Filed by the Attorney General of Canada, this action sought
damages under RICO “based on lost tax revenue and additional
law enforcement costs.”32 In 1991, Canada doubled the taxes on
cigarettes.33

To circumvent the Canadian cigarette taxes, R.J.

Reynolds smuggled cigarettes across the Canadian border. 34 To do
30

18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(a) (1970).
See Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001);
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005); European Cmty. v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d. 123 (2d Cir. 2004); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco,
424 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2005).
32
268 F.3d at 105 (2d Cir. 2001). Defendants to the action included: RJRMacDonald, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company, Northern Brands International, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
International, Inc., and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company PR. Id. at 106.
33
Id. at 106.
34
Id. at 105. These cigarettes were then sold on the black market. Id.
31
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this, Reynolds “exported cigarettes from Canada to the United
States,” falsely declaring to Canadian border patrol that the
cigarettes were not for consumption in Canada.35 Reynolds then
sold the merchandise to known smugglers, who then sold the
cigarettes to black market distributors and smuggled the cigarettes
back into Canada.36 In 1992, Canada imposed a second cigarette
tax on exported cartons of cigarettes.37 Defendants then began
shipping “raw Canadian tobacco to Puerto Rico, where RJR PR
manufactured Canadian-style cigarettes made to look as if they had
been made by RJR-MacDonald in Canada.”38

R.J. Reynolds

utilized “United States mails and wires to make payments and to
place and receive orders.”39
Canada brought a civil RICO action as it “is a broadly
worded statue that ‘has as its purpose the elimination of infiltration
of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations
operating in interstate commerce.’”40 The New York Northern

35

Id. at 106.
Id. at 106-07. Some of the smugglers consisted of residents of the St.
Regis/Akwesasne Indian Reservation. Id. R.J. Reynolds and the smugglers took
advantage of the Foreign Trade Zones in upstate New York. Id. (Definition of
Foreign Trade Zone found in the Foreign Trade Zone Act of 1996 19 U.S.C.A. §
81a).
37
Id. at 107.
38
Id. RJR PR made and shipped almost one billion Canadian style cigarettes
from 1992 to 1993. Id. “To conceal their relationship with smugglers,
defendants created NBI and directed their Canadian sales through it.” Id.
39
Id. “In 1997 and 1998, the United States indicted NBI and 21 individuals in
connection with these smuggling activities.” Id. “Several individuals involved in
the scheme pled guilty to . . . wire fraud, aiding and abetting smuggling,
conspiring to defraud the United States, currency violations, money laundering,
and criminal RICO violations.” Id.
40
Id. (citing Senate Report Number 91-617, at 76 (1969)).
36
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District Court found that Canada fell into the category of a person
entitled to bring a RICO claim, but granted R.J. Reynolds motion
to dismiss the complaint stating the Revenue Rule barred the
claim.41 To prove it suffered an injury, Canada would “have to
prove, and the Court will have to pass on, the validity of Canadian
revenue laws and their applicability hereto and the court would be,
in essence, enforcing Canadian revenue laws. “Enforcing foreign
revenue laws is precisely the type of meddling in foreign affairs
the Revenue Rule forbids.”42

The court also noted the treaty

between the United States and Canada “with respect to the
recognition and enforcement of certain tax liabilities.”43
Canada appealed this decision to the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals arguing the inapplicability of the Revenue Rule. The
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision that the
Revenue Rule and the treaty with the United States barred
Canada’s civil RICO claims.44 Judge Katzmann, writing for the
majority, listed the reasons for affirming the lower court’s

41

Id. at 108. The district court judge refused “to dismiss the action under the actof-state and political-question doctrines. Id. The court also denied the claim
because “a government’s claim for damages based on increased law
enforcement and related costs does not satisfy civil RICO’s requirement that the
plaintiff suffer an injury to its commercial interests; and that RICO does not
provide for disgorgement and other equitable relief requested by Canada.” Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 108. This treaty delineated “the extent to which one country’s revenue
claims may be enforced in the other, and to limit such enforcement to ‘finally
determined’ revenue claims.”
44
Id. at 106.
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Respect for sovereignty45 and judicial role and

competence.46

The decision also addresses criticism of the

Revenue Rule47 and the interaction of RICO and the Revenue
Rule.48

The majority asserts a difference between civil and

criminal RICO claims.49 Before concluding, the Court discussed
the implications of Canada arguing for the direct or indirect

45

Id. at 111. The Revenue Rule “prevents foreign sovereigns from asserting
their sovereignty within the borders of other nations, thereby helping nations
maintain their mutual respect and security.”
46
The Court wrote, “The conduct of foreign relations is committed largely to the
Executive Branch, with power in the Legislative Branch to, inter alia, ratify
treaties with foreign sovereigns.” Id. at 114. “Extraterritorial tax enforcement
directly implicates relations between our country and other sovereign nations.
When a foreign nation appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement
of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues . . . better
handled—by the political branches of the government.” Id.
47
Id. at 124-26. The rule is obsolete “in an age when . . . instantaneous transfer
of assets can be easily arranged.” Id., at 125 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 483, Reporter’s Note 2 (1987)). “It is not
clear why difficulties in proving or interpreting foreign law would be any greater
[with revenue laws] than in other civil suits involving foreign laws.” Id. (citing
Thomas B. Stoel, Jr., The Enforcement of Foreign Non-criminal Penal &
Revenue Judgments in England & the United States, 16 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
663, 668-69 (1967)). Forum non conveniens . . . remains applicable. Id. (citing
Thomas B. Stoel, Jr., The Enforcement of Foreign Non-criminal Penal &
Revenue Judgments in England & the United States, 16 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
663, 668-69 (1967)). The act-of-state doctrine contradicts the Revenue Rule by
stating “a court presumes the validity of a foreign state’s laws within that state’s
territory.” Id. at 126.
48
Id. at 126-30. Canada argued the lower court should not have dismissed the
case without “carefully examining [RICO’s] structure, purpose, and policies
before applying common law rules to restrict or modify . . .” Id. at 126. The
Second Circuit found that “the Revenue Rule is a doctrine with continuing
force” and that Canada could not “show that RICO bars the application of the
Revenue Rule.” Id. RICO did not clearly abrogate the Revenue Rule and,
therefore, it can be barred by the Revenue Rule. Id. at 127-28.
49
Id. at 123. “[W]ith regard to the Revenue Rule, there is a critical difference
between this civil suit brought by a foreign sovereign and the criminal actions
previously considered by panel of this court.” See Attorney General of Canada
v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2001).
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enforcement of its foreign tax laws under the Revenue Rule.50 The
Second Circuit concluded the Revenue Rule barred Canada’s
RICO claim and the lower court was correct in dismissing the
action.51
Judge Calabresi wrote a dissenting opinion arguing the
Revenue Rule did not bar Canada’s claim.52

He stressed the

Restatement53 and argued that Canadian tax laws are only
indirectly related to the action.54 He rebutted the argument of
sovereign interests, explaining that in order to further American
sovereign interests “we are bound to entertain suits brought under
federal statutes, and to award the damages that such statutes
establish.”55
50

The arguments of separation of power and court

Id. at 130-34. Canada brought a claim for the court “to assess and adjudicate
the application of Canadian tax laws to wrongdoing alleged in its complaint,”
not “the enforcement of a final, fully adjudicated Canadian tax judgment.” Id. at
130. To find if a claim is direct or indirect the court “must look to the ‘object’ of
the claim.” Id. at 131. “Indirect enforcement occurs where a foreign State (or its
nominee) in form seeks a remedy, not based on the foreign rule in question, but
which in substance is designed to give it extra-territorial effect.” Id. (citing
Albert Venn Dicey, J.H.C. Morris, & Lawrence Collins, DICEY AND MORRIS ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 91 (Sweet & Maxwell, 13th ed. 2000)). The “Revenue
Rule ‘relates only to enforcement, but it does not prevent recognition of a
foreign [revenue] law.’” Id. at 133 (citing Albert Venn Dicey, J.H.C. Morris, &
Lawrence Collins, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 90 (Sweet &
Maxwell, 13th ed. 2000) (emphasis added)).
51
Id. at 134-35.
52
Id. at 135-141.
53
Id. at 135. The Restatement states, “courts in the United States are not
required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines or
penalties rendered by the courts of other states.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (1987)).
54
Id. at 135. (“The Canadian tax laws come into play only indirectly, as a factor
to be used in the calculation of damages, and do so entirely because the RICO
statute itself makes the Canadian law relevant to that calculation.”).
55
Id. at 136. Congress created this action when they enacted RICO, which
means “our government has determined that this suit advances our own interest,
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competency,56 and the difficulty in “figuring out the meaning and
significance of some foreign laws—especially foreign tax laws”57
are also rebutted. The dissent also insists the critical difference
between civil and criminal RICO actions asserted by the majority
opinion “founders in the face of the Supreme Court’s consistent
refusal to treat criminal and civil RICO actions differently.”58
European Community I & II, later Second Circuit cases, rely
heavily on this case.
2. Pasquantino v. United States
Pasquantio v. United States59 is a case brought by the
United States government on behalf the Canadian government for
a violation of the United States wire fraud statute.60

The

petitioners61 were indicted and convicted of federal wire fraud.
The trio carried out a scheme to defraud the Canadian government
of liquor taxes by smuggling liquor from the United States into

and any collateral effect furthering the governmental interests of a foreign
sovereign is, therefore, necessarily incidental. Id.
56
Id. at 136-37. Separation of power is not a concern “whenever the legislative
and executive branches have created the cause of action.” Id. at 137. The goal
of RICO “is to divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains.” Id.
“To reject the application of civil RICO to the case at hand is to hamper this
congressional objective.” Id. (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585
(1981)).
57
Id. Citing United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547 (Second Cir. 1997), and
United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (Second Cir. 2000), the dissent shows two
instances in which the Second Circuit has rejected “the rationale for the revenue
that is based on the desire to avoid analysis of foreign statutes.” Id. at 138.
58
Id. at 139 (Second Cir. 2001); see Attorney General of Canada v. R.J.
Reynolds, supra note 32, at 139.
59
Pasaquinto, supra note 20, at 349.
60
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
61
Carl J. Pasquantino, David b. Pasquantino, and Arthur Hilts.
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Canada.62 Canada had almost doubled the liquor purchasing price
at the time of the smuggling operation by taxing liquor imported
from the United States to Canada.63 Pasquantino moved to dismiss
the wire fraud charge because the United States did not have a
sufficient interest in enforcing Canada’s revenue laws. 64

The

District Court denied the motion and the jury convicted the
Pasquantinos of wire fraud.65 The Pasquantinos appealed to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the panel reversed the
convictions.66 The Fourth Circuit reheard the case en banc and
vacated the panel’s decision and affirmed the conviction.67 The
Court concluded “the common-law Revenue Rule, rather than
barring any recognition of foreign revenue law, simply allowed
courts to refuse to enforce the tax judgments . . . and therefore did
not preclude the Government from prosecuting petitioners.”68 The
Fourth Circuit also held Canada had a right to receive tax revenue
as “‘money or property’ within the meaning of the wire fraud
statute.”69

The Supreme Court of the United States granted

certiorari “to resolve a conflict in the Court of Appeals over
62

Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 353. While in New York, the Pasquantinos
ordered liquor from discount package stores in Maryland over the phone. Id.
They hired Hilts to hid liquor in their cars and drive over the Canadian border
without declaring the liquor or paying the required taxes. Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 353-54.
65
Id. at 354.
66
Id. Pasquantinos argued “their prosecution contravened the common-law
revenue rule, because it required the court to take cognizance of the revenue
laws of Canada.” Id.
67
Id. (citing Pasquantino v. U.S., 336 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003)).
68
Id. (citing Pasquantino v. U.S., 336 F.3d 321, 327-29 (4th Cir. 2003)).
69
Id. (citing Pasquantino v. U.S., 336 F.3d 321, 331-32 (4th Cir. 2003)).
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whether a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue
violates the wire fraud statute.”70
The Court first considered if the conduct committed by the
Pasquantinos fell within the literal terms of the wire fraud statute.71
Next, the Court contemplated the Revenue Rule argument.72 One
of the biggest arguments against the Revenue Rule comes from the
fact that “this is a criminal prosecution brought by the United
States in its sovereign capacity to punish domestic criminal
conduct” not a suit to recover foreign tax liability.73 Like the
Second Circuit, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of indirect
versus direct enforcement of taxes. The Court stated, “The line the
Revenue Rule draws between impermissible and permissible
‘enforcement’ of foreign revenue law has therefore always been
unclear.”74
70

Id.
Id. at 355-59. The wire fraud statute “prohibits using interstate wires to effect
"any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."” Id. at 355 (citing
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000)). The Court found Canada had a property right to the
uncollected taxes. Id. The Court also found the Pasquantinos committed a
scheme to defraud Canada of its property and fell directly within the terms of the
wire fraud statute. Id. at 357.
72
Id. at 359-70. “We are aware of no common-law revenue case decided as of
1952 that held or clearly implied that the revenue rule barred the United States
from prosecuting a fraudulent scheme to evade foreign taxes.” Id. at 360.
73
Id. at 362. This is an argument used later by the Second Circuit as to why they
declined to follow Pasquantino for a civil RICO case brought by a foreign
country. See European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir.
2005).
74
Id. at 367. “This court will not aid a foreign country in the enforcement of its
revenue laws, it will not refuse to direct a just and equitable administration of
that part of an estate within its jurisdiction merely because such direction would
result in the enforcement of such revenue laws.” Id. at 367-68 (citing In re
Hollins, 139 N.Y.S. 713, 717 (Sur. Ct. 1913)). “It is sometimes difficult to draw
71
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The

majority found that the revenue rule was not a clear bar to the
case.76 The Court also noted Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure provided sufficient means for courts “to
resolve the incidental foreign law issues they may encounter in
wire fraud prosecutions.”77 The Supreme Court also stated their
interpretation did not give the wire fraud statute extraterritorial
effect, disputing Justice Ginsburg’s assertion in his dissent that it
did.78
Justice Ginsburg wrote for the dissent asserting statutes
should be domestic not extraterritorial.79 Ginsburg only mentioned
the RICO statute once at the end of the dissent.80

the line between an issue involving merely recognition of a foreign law and
indirect enforcement of it.” Id. at 368 (citing ALBERT VENN DICEY, J.H.C.
MORRIS, & LAWRENCE COLLINS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 90 (13th ed. 2000)).
75
Id. at 371.
76
Id. at 368.
77
Id. at 370.
78
Id. at 371. The Court stated, “Petitioners used U.S. interstate wires to execute
a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of tax revenue. Their offense was
complete the moment they executed the scheme inside the United States . . . .
This domestic element of petitioners’ conduct is what the Government is
punishing . . . no less than when it prosecutes a scheme to defraud a foreign
individual or corporation, or a foreign government acting as a market
participant.” Id.
79
Id. at 373. “The Court has "adopt[ed] the legal presumption that Congress
ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application."”
Id. (citing Small v. United States 544 U.S. 385, at 388-89 n. 3 (2005)).
80
Id. at 383. “A finding that particular conduct constitutes wire fraud therefore
exposes certain defendants to the severe criminal penalties and forfeitures
provide in both RICO, see § 1963 (2000 ed.), and the money laundering statute,
§ 1956(a), (b) (2000 ed. And Supp. II).” Id.

2014]

RACKING UP THE MONEY

17

3. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. (EC I & II)
The European Community (EC)81 brought a claim in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
against RJR Nabisco, Inc. for lost tax revenue due to cigarette
smuggling.82 After dismissal of their complaint from the district
court due to the Revenue Rule, European Community sought an
appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.83
The Second Circuit relied heavily on their previous opinion
in Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds (Canada).84 The
EC tried to distinguish its suit from by using the USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001.85 The Second Circuit did not agree with this assertion
and stated “the Patriot Act and its legislative history do not
constitute the clear evidence of congressional intent necessary to
find that Congress has abrogated the Revenue Rule.”86 The EC,
then, filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme
81

The European Community consisted of the Kingdom of Belgium, Republic of
Finland, French Republic, Hellenic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany,
Italian Republic, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Portuguese Republic, and Kingdom of Spain.
82
European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir.2004).
The action was “three actions treated as related and decided together.” Id. at
128. The EC alleged the defendants “directed and facilitated contraband
cigarette smuggling by studying smuggling routes, soliciting smugglers, and
supplying them with cigarettes.” Id. Using forged shipping documents, the
smugglers routed the cigarettes "so as to avoid paying the customs duties and
excise taxes of the countries into which the cigarettes were smuggled.” Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 131-32.
85
Id. at 127, 136-38 (2004). “Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001, which amended RICO to . . . allow foreign sovereigns to
use RICO to impose liability on domestic tobacco companies that attempt to
evade their revenue laws.” Id. at 127.
86
Id.
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The Court granted the petition, vacated the Court of

Appeals judgment, and remanded the case back to the Second
Circuit “for further consideration in light of Pasquantino v. United
States.”88
Normally the Second Circuit is “bound by the decisions of
prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en
banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme Court.”89 An exception
arises “where there has been an intervening Supreme Court
decision that casts doubt on [the Second Circuit’s] controlling
precedent.”90

Using this exception rule, the Second Circuit

reinstated its decision from EC II.
The Second Circuit considered Pasquantino and its impact
on civil RICO cases.91 The Court pointed out the government’s
decision to represent Canada in the case.92 The United States, by
bringing the case on behalf of Canada greatly diminished the

87

European Community v. RJR Nabisco, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005).
Id.
89
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 424 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing
United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004)).
90
Id. (citing Union of Needletrades, Indust. & Textile Empl. v. INS, 336 F.3d
200, 210 (2d Cir. 2003)).
91
Id. at 180.
92
Id. By the government representing Canada, the Court “found ‘little risk of
causing the principal evil against which the Revenue Rule was traditionally
thought to guard: judicial evaluation of the policy-laden enactments of other
sovereigns.’” Id. (citing Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 368
(2005)). The action implies the Executive Branch has assessed the risk of
pursing a case in United States courts. Id. (“We may assume that by electing to
bring this prosecution, the Executive has assessed this prosecution’s impact on
this Nation’s relationship with Canada, and concluded that it poses little danger
of causing international friction.” Id. at 181 (citing Pasquantino v. United States,
544 U.S. 349, 368 (2005))).
88
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The United States

involvement served as a key factor in Pasquantino.94 The Second
Circuit pointed out the United States lack of involvement as a
crucial difference between the two cases.95
The Court also asserted Pasquantino reaffirmed the
Circuit’s previous decisions “under which the Revenue Rule was
held inapplicable to § 1343 smuggling prosecutions.”96 The Court
asserted the Supreme Court decision implies a suit with a
secondary objective “irrelevant to revenue collection might still be
barred by the rule.”97 The substance of the claim had not changed
and remained “that the defendants violated foreign tax laws.”98
The Second Circuit found no reason to deviate from its previous
decision and reinstated the verdict from EC I.99
Next, this Comment will argue that the Revenue Rule
should be limited in scope so that it no longer bars any RICO
claims brought by foreign countries in two ways: by (1) never
allowing the Revenue Rule to trump RICO claims or (2)
completely abolishing the Revenue Rule and allowing America to
interpret foreign countries’ tax laws.
93

In the alternative, this

Id. at 181.
Id.
95
Id. “The executive branch has given us no signal that it consents to this
litigation.” Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 182. The EC points out that the Supreme Court’s decision adopts a
narrow version of the Revenue Rule. Id. at 181. The narrow version of the rule
bars only suits “whose ‘whole object’ is the collection of foreign tax revenue.”
Id. The Court rejected this argument.
98
Id. at 182.
99
Id. at 182-83.
94
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comment contends that if the Revenue Rule cannot be restricted,
(3) foreign countries should appeal to the United States
government to bring these claims on their behalf.
II. Argument
A.
1.

Limiting the Revenue Rule

Never Allowing RICO Claims to Be Banned by the
Revenue Rule
In RICO cases, the Revenue Rule should be restricted so

that it does not bar RICO claims.

Smuggling and other

racketeering crimes occur not only in the United States but also in
foreign countries.100 There are laws in place in the United States to
protect companies and persons from smuggling, counterfeiting,
and fraud. We have implemented civil and criminal proceedings to
handle these cases.

This protection should extend to foreign

countries with which we engage in treaties and contracts. We
consider most of these countries allies and enter into trade
agreements with them.101 This does not stop American citizens or
corporations from engaging in the same smuggling, counterfeiting,
and fraud we see in the United States in these foreign countries.102
Since these acts occur overseas, these countries need a way to
procure remedies from the crimes committed against them.

100

See Pasquantino, supra note 20; European Cmty v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355
F.3d. 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
101
There are some arguments for dismissing the Revenue Rule only in those
cases in which we have a treaty with the foreign country. Those arguments are
outside the scope of this Comment.
102
See note 100.
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RICO allows for foreign countries to bring claims against
these wrong doers in the United States.103

By allowing the

Revenue Rule to bar these claims it effectively renders RICO
useless in protecting these countries and deterring the very conduct
it seeks to prohibit and outlaw. If the Revenue Rule is to continue
to exist in common law tradition, it needs to be limited in scope so
as not to interfere with RICO claims brought before United States
District Courts. Statutory laws codified in the United States Code
are not normally trumped by judicially made common law rules.
One canon of statutory interpretation states, “statutes which invade
the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the
retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a
statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”104 RICO’s blatant
wording allows foreign claims to be brought into the district courts
of the United States in spite of the Revenue Rule’s longestablished principles.

RICO defines racketeering as “any act

which is indictable under . . . . [offenses] relating to trafficking in
contraband cigarettes . . . . any offense involving fraud . . . or . . .
importation . . . buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a
controlled substance or listed chemical . . . .”105 The Act goes on
to state, “It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control
103

18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(a) (1995); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(a) (1970); 18 U.S.C.A. §
1961(1)(b) (2013).
104
Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 359.
105
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1).
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of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”106 These cases interrupt
foreign commerce. When cigarette and liquor smuggling rings
commence, though most of the activities may be conducted in the
United States, there is still wire and mail fraud transactions that not
only cross interstate lines, but interrupt foreign commerce as well.
The statute “‘Speaks directly’ to the question addressed by
the common law,” which is can the United States interpret the
foreign laws of other states.107 RICO explicitly gives the United
States the jurisdiction unbarred by the Revenue Rule to hear these
cases brought by other countries. In addition there is “no commonlaw Revenue Rule case decided as of 1952 [the year the wire fraud
statute was created] that held or clearly implied that the Revenue
Rule barred the United States from prosecuting a fraudulent
scheme to evade foreign taxes.”108

Not only does the RICO

wording explicitly override the Revenue Rule’s intent, there is no
case history to support the revenue barring such claims. Around
the time of the creation of the Revenue Rule, courts “considered
void foreign contracts that lacked tax stamps required under
foreign revenue law.”109 If it was not valid under the foreign court,
it was not valid in the English courts. The line the Revenue Rule

106

18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(b).
Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 359 (citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.D.
529, 534 (1993)).
108
Id. at 360.
109
Id. at 367 (citing Alves v. Hodgson, 101 Eng. Rep. 953, 955 (K.B. 1797);
Clegg v. Levy, 170 Eng. Rep. 1343 (N.P. 1812)).
107
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draws has been unclear and the clarity of the RICO Act clearly
keeps the ambiguous rule from barring its suits.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 483
states, “Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or
to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes . . .”110 This does
not mean that they cannot.

States are not required to deny

enforcing foreign tax judgments.

The Restatement gives the

United States the option of whether or not to recognize or enforce
the judgment.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and ultimately
the Supreme Court agreed with this idea.111 Quoting the Fourth
Circuit, the Supreme Court agreed, “the common-law Revenue
Rule, rather than barring any recognition of foreign revenue law,
simply allowed courts to refuse to enforce the tax judgments of
foreign nations . . . .”112 The Revenue Rule should not become an
easy way out for courts not to hear disputes when their citizens are
committing crimes abroad.
In limiting the Revenue Rule in foreign RICO cases, it
would be wise to look at direct versus indirect tax claims. Because
the revenue gives the option of whether a United States Court will
hear a case on foreign tax issues, if the tax law is only indirectly
related to case “as a factor to be used in the calculation of

110

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF TAX AND PENAL JJUDGMENTS § 483 (1987) (emphasis added).
111
Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 354-55 (citing U.S. v Pasquantino, 336 F.3d
321, 327-29 (4th Cir. 2003)..
112
Id.
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damages” it should not be barred.113 In this case, the court would
not be interpreting foreign state’s tax laws because “the RICO
statute itself makes [the laws] relevant to that calculation.”114
Here, foreign sovereignties would not be asking our courts to
interpret and enforce foreign laws; they are asking the courts to
grant a judgment “from the violation of a United States statute.”115
The Revenue Rule’s philosophy is embedded in refusing
the “obligation to further the governmental interests of a foreign
sovereign.”116 But by hearing cases that only indirectly relate to
foreign taxes, we would not be furthering foreign sovereignties
interests in their states, but “further[ing] American’s sovereign
interests [by entertaining] suits brought under federal statutes, and
to award the damages that such statues establish.”117 Creating and
following the RICO statutes advances American’s interests and it
is only indirectly that foreign states may be aided. America cannot
pick and choose to follow her laws when they are convenient or
they do not like the plaintiff bringing suit, she must follow the
rules her Congress has enacted and take the cases presented before
her, even though these decisions may inadvertently aid a foreign
country.118
113

RICO’s primary function “is ‘not merely to

See, Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc.,
268 F.3d 103, 135 (Second Cir. 2001) (Circuit Judge Calabresi dissenting).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 136 (Circuit Judge Calabresi dissenting) (citing Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964)).
117
Id.
118
Id. (“Whether our decision today indirectly assists [foreign states] in keeping
smugglers at bay or assists them in the collection of taxes, is not our Court’s
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compensate victims but . . . to [eliminate] racketeering activity.”119
It may be “true that [United States courts] will not aid a foreign
country in the enforcement of its revenue laws, it will not refuse to
direct a just and equitable administration of that part of an estate
within its jurisdiction merely because such direction would result
in the enforcement of such revenue laws.”120

Indirectly using

overseas tax laws to accomplish this goal does not diminish the
Revenue Rule at all, but furthers the legitimacy of the American
court systems. If the Revenue Rule cannot be restricted to allow
all foreign RICO claims to be heard, then it should be limited to
allowing claims that only need the indirect involvement of foreign
laws.
The Second Circuit in European Community v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc., stated “A claim that triggers the Revenue Rule is
barred unless the plaintiffs establish that superior law, such as a
federal statute that provides the applicable right of action,
abrogates the rule in the context in which the plaintiffs seek to
enforce their tax laws.”121 When dealing with issues that would
impact foreign relations, the statute seeking to abrogate the
common law “must speak directly to the matter in order to

Concern.” (quoting United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 553 (Second Cir.
1997)))
119
Id. at 137 (citing Rotello v. Wood, 528 U.Sl 549, 557 (2000)).
120
Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 367-68 (citing In re Hollins, 79 Misc. 200, 208
(Sur. Ct. 1913)).
121
European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 132 (emphasis
added) (citing Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings,
Inc., 268 F.3d 103 at 113, 119, 126.).
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Though the Second Circuit led by Judge

Sotomayor did not agree, RICO is a statute that explicitly
abrogates the Revenue Rule.
2.

Should the Revenue Rule Be Abolished Completely?
If the Revenue Rule cannot be limited in scope it should be

abolished in its entirety. Though the rule is almost three hundred
years old,123 it does not specifically deny courts the right to hear
foreign tax issues.124 Though there is an argument that the United
States is unable to interpret the laws of foreign states. There is no
evidence as to why “proving or interpreting foreign law would be
any greater than in other civil suits involving foreign law.”125
Implementing certain court processes easily overcomes this
argument.

Foreign countries must provide experts as well as

translated versions of the appropriate laws to be interpreted. Also
they should provide experts to testify on the legitimacy of the law.
This poses an expensive burden on the foreign company, but if
they are adamant in bringing claims for taxes, then this is not an
impossible task. The foreign country’s laws then become an issue
of fact that must be proven before the case can proceed. Once
proven, the United States courts are now qualified to interpret the
122

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Attorney General of Canada v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 at 129).
123
Mallinak, supra note 3, 79.
124
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, Supra note 110
(“Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or enforce . . . other
states.”).
125
Thomas B. Stoel, The Enforcement of Foreign Non-criminal Penal &
Revenue Judgments in England & the United States, 16 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
663, 668 (1967).
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laws and will proceed in the cases with adequate understanding of
those foreign laws. This would not be too complicated to enforce
in courts because “Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 . . .
[sets] forth a procedure for interpreting foreign law that improves
on those available at common law. [I]t permits a court . . . to
consider ‘any relevant material or source—including testimony—
without regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence.”126 There is also
a similar rule in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 44.1
states, “In determining foreign law, the court may consider any
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not
submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on
a question of law.”127 This would prevent one of the two concerns
the Revenue Rule seeks to address: “policy complications and
embarrassment [that] may follow when one nation’s courts analyze
the validity of another nation’s tax laws.”128 The second concern is
addressed later in this Comment.
The Second Circuit in Attorney General of Canada v. R.J.
Reynolds, lays out a set of criticisms for the Revenue Rule. These
criticisms show why the rule should no longer be used and in
modern times have become obsolete.

Advances in laws and

technology make it possible to arrange for easy “instantaneous

126

Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 370.
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 44.1.
128
European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir.
2005).
127

2014]

RACKING UP THE MONEY

28

transfer of assets.”129 In the twenty-first century, “virtually all
states impose and collect taxes.”130 The fact that all states impose
taxes and the ability to instantaneously transfer funds and assets
makes enforcing judgments for foreign states much easier. There
is no long complicated process to transfer one parties funds in
America to pay off the debt they owe Canada. The rule has little
basis and simply survives because “it [has] been in effect for [over]
two centuries.”131 Since its appearance in 1729,132 there has been
“scanty reasoning justifying the rule’s emergence.”133 The rule
simply appeared with no justification and in its beginnings did not
“provide the basis of decision.”134 If courts follow the rule as it
was created, it should not provide the basis for decisions in these
RICO cases when it was not originally used to do so, even if it has
been used for hundreds of years. Though stare decisis is typically
the method followed by courts, centuries old traditions should be
broken when they become no longer necessary.
In addition to being technologically obsolete, the Revenue
Rule is not needed because there are “other doctrines now used to
bar enforcement of foreign claims [that] would remain in

129

Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 125 (Second
Cir. 2001) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,
Reporter’s Note 2 (1987)).
130
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 110
(Reporter’s Note 2).
131
Id.
132
The Attorney General v. Lutwydge & Al’., 145 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ex. Div.
1729).
133
Canada, 268 F.3d at 125.
134
Id.
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effect.”135 The United States could use the principle of forum non
conveniens to take care of certain civil cases in the absence of the
Revenue Rule. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Law Relations
§ 421 outlines when a state has jurisdiction to adjudicate.136 If
these criteria are not met than the state cannot hear the case. This
is a more concrete and effective rule than the Revenue Rule.
Section 421(1) states, “A state may exercise jurisdiction through its
courts to adjudicate with respect to a person or thing if the
relationship of the state to the person or thing is such as to make
the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.”137 Section 421(2) details
the qualification for a person to be tried in a state.138 In these
RICO cases, if the company defendants are not United States
citizens as classified by § 421(2)(e) then they would be barred
from bringing the claim in the United States.139 There is no longer
a need for the Revenue Rule to bar these claims. In addition to
forum non conveniens, “local public policy could still be
invoked.”140

If adjudicating and enforcing a foreign judgment

offended public policy then that justification could bar the claim.
Changing times are forcing the Revenue Rule to retire making way
for other measures to bar these civil RICO claims in its place.

135

Stoel, supra note 125, at 668.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421 (1987).
137
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(1) (1987).
138
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2) (1987).
139
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2)(e) (1987).
(“[T]he person, if a corporation or comparable juridical person, is organized
pursuant to the law of the state”) Id.
140
Stoel, supra note 125, at 669.
136
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The Second Circuit argues that “the foreign affairs and
separation of powers rationales for the Revenue Rule” overrides
the many points against it.141 The Court specifically focuses on the
fact that the United States and Canada have “recognized the
vitality of the Revenue Rule and have a well-established treaty
process that has strictly limited the extent to which each
government can pursue its tax claims.”142 The Court does not
address the issue of if the country bringing the claim does not have
a treaty process established with the United States. Treaties, as
discussed later in this comment, are not always the best way to
overcome the Revenue Rule. Even if the two countries do have a
treaty, then they would not be barred by the Revenue Rule, but by
the four corners of the signed treaty.
The Revenue Rule also seems to contradict the act of state
doctrine. The act of state doctrine states “a court presumes the
validity of a foreign state’s laws within that state’s territory.”143
This in essence precludes courts in the United States from
inquiring about the validity of a foreign state’s domestic law.144
This law is assumed to be valid in the foreign country and it is not
up to American courts to try and prove the law’s invalidity. In
opposition,

“the

revenue

presumes

the

extraterritorial

unenforceability of a foreign sovereign’s tax laws.”145 The Second
141

Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 125 (2d Cir.
2001).
142
Id.
143
Id. (citing Galu v. Swissair, 873 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1989)).
144
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
145
Canada, 268 F 3d at 125.
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Circuit disagreed that the two were completely inconsistent and
instead sided with the idea that “the rules are consistent and
‘represent two different ways in which courts steer clear of foreign
affairs in different contexts.’”146 This argument when combined
with the Supreme Court’s statements in Sabbatino, seem to provide
the only argument in favor of the revenue not easily disputed.147
The act of state doctrine arguably enables “courts to avoid
entanglement with questions about the underlying validity of a
foreign sovereign’s laws.”148
After the ruling in Sabbatino, the legislature enacted 22
U.S.C.A. § 2370 limiting the act of state doctrine. It disallows any
court to “decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine
to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the
principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or
other rights to property is asserted by any party including a foreign
state . . . .”149 This included “the principles of compensation . . .
.”150 If the President determines in any case an “application of the
act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the
foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to
146

Id.
Id. at 125-26 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Peter L. F. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 423 (1964)). (The act of state doctrine “arises out of the basic
relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of
powers . . . The Judicial Branch[‘s] engagement in the task of passing on the
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s
pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in
the international sphere”).
148
Id. at 126.
149
22 U.S.C.A. §2370 (2).
150
Id.
147
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this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court,” the act
of state doctrine will be applied.151

This limitation helps the

Revenue Rule trump the act of state doctrine.
The majority in Attorney General of Canada v. R.J.
Reynolds152 argues that the concern interpreting other countries’
statutory law is “beyond the purview of the courts of this country .
. . [and] the pragmatic reason that it is very complicated.”153 This
argument has been tackled and rejected by the very court which
brought it.

In United States v. Trapilo,154 the Second Circuit

undertook “the question whether a scheme . . . to defraud the
Canadian government of tax revenue is cognizable under the
federal wire fraud statute.”155

In that case the Revenue Rule

provided no reason to bar the claim.156

“Because the statute

prohibited schemes to defraud regardless of their success [like
RICO], we assumed that we could find a violation without delving
into the intricacies of Canadian law.”157

Addressing the same

question in United States v. Pierce,158 the Court first established a
property right and then, if there is a conviction, “the sentencing
guidelines require that the sentence be imposed based on the
151

Id.
Canada, 268 F 3d at 135.
153
Id. at 137 (Circuit Judge Calabresi dissenting).
154
130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997).
155
Canada, 268 F.3d at 138 (Circuit Judge Calabresi dissenting) (citing United
States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 548 (2d Cir. 1997)).
156
Id. (Circuit Judge Calabresi dissent) (citing United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d
547, 551 (2d Cir. 1997)).
157
Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547,
552-53 (2d Cir. 1997)).
158
United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000).
152
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amount of tax revenue lost.”159 These guidelines make it necessary
to consider foreign tax laws making the Revenue Rule claims
unneeded. “The [sentencing] guidelines mandate this degree of
involvement to determine . . . the existence of a RICO civil action
and to calculate the proper damages under that action.”160 The
Revenue Rule is no longer needed as RICO transcends the
Revenue Rule’s boundaries and “has been effectively rejected by
[the Second Circuit].”161 Though Trapilo and Pierce were both
criminal cases, “there is no reason why the same courts must be
deemed incompetent to undertake an identical analysis in civil
RICO cases.”162 This fact is in the light “of the Supreme Court’s
consistent refusal to treat criminal and civil RICO actions
differently.”163

Also there has been no stated reason for the

Revenue Rule to treat civil and criminal cases differently.164

159

268 F.3d at 138 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Pierce, 224
F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000)).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 139.
163
Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting). (“The Court made clear that it would not
interpret civil RICO narrowly in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). The Court noted that its broad
interpretation of civil RICO ‘is amply supported by our prior cases and the
general principles surrounding the statute.... This is the lesson not only of
Congress's self-consciously expansive language and overall approach, ... but
also of its express admonition that RICO is to “be literally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes.”’ Id. at 497–98 (citation omitted) (quoting
Pub.L. 91–452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947)”).
164
Id. at 139.
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Gaining Executive Consent, Allowing the U.S. to Try
Foreign RICO Cases
The Second Circuit argues vigorously that one of the main

differences between Pasquantino and European Community is that
the United States was the party bringing the claim in
Pasquantino.165 The Court established “the fact of the prosecution
[in Pasquantino] implies an assessment of risk by the executive
branch on which the courts may rely” and by bringing the
prosecution “the Executive has assessed this prosecution’s impact
on this Nation’s relationship with Canada, and concluded that it
poses little danger of causing international friction.”166 Executive
consent, therefore, is another way to circumvent the Revenue Rule
and try foreign RICO claims.
Gaining executive consent in these foreign RICO cases,
tackles the second problem the Revenue Rule seeks to address:
“that the executive branch, not the judicial branch, should decide
when our nation will aid others in enforcing their tax laws.”167 By
the executive branch bringing these cases it implies “there is little
reason to worry about infringing on the executive’s sphere of
decision-making, and the rule will not be applied.”168

Once

executive consent is given and the United States brings the claim,

165

European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 181 (2d Cir.
2005).
166
Id. at 180-81.
167
Id. at 180 (citing Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103,
131 (2d Cir. 2001)).
168
Id. (citing Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 132
(2d Cir. 2001)).
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there is “little risk of causing the principal evil against which the
Revenue Rule was traditionally thought to guard: judicial
evaluation of the policy-laden enactments of other sovereigns.”169
The United States has assessed the risk and the impact bringing a
case of this nature may have on foreign relations.170 It also means
there is “little danger of causing international friction.”171 This
allows the suit to bypass the Revenue Rule as it will not be
triggered in a case brought by the United States in the United
States.
When the United States brings these foreign RICO cases on
behalf of other countries it also eliminates the concern of
separation of powers issues.172 The Second Circuit found that
“where the two political branches have approved a legal action that
may advance the policies of a foreign government, the courts do
not overstep their authority by allowing the action to go
forward.”173 This eliminates almost all concerns courts have had
when considering these foreign RICO cases and it allows the
Revenue Rule to remain intact as it has for over three centuries.174
It also keeps the courts from going beyond their powers and
dealing with “the relations between the states themselves, with

169

Id. (citing Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 369.
Id. at 180-81.
171
Id. at 180 (citing Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005)).
172
Id. at 181.
173
Id.
174
An issue may arise as to how a country may properly secure Executive
permission to bring a foreign RICO case but that is not covered within the scope
of this Comment.
170
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which the courts are incompetent to deal.”175 The Executive is
more in tune to the relationships between the United States and
other countries. By requiring foreign states to obtain Executive
permission and allowing them to be represented by the state, we
bypass the problem of possibly creating international tension
between allies. An assumption can be made that the Executive, in
bringing these types of prosecutions, has assessed any impact this
type of case could have on foreign relationships “and concluded
that it poses little danger of causing international friction.”176
There are no common-law courts that have used the Revenue Rule
to bar a case brought by the United States government on behalf of
a foreign state.177
For these reasons, an alternative to the revenue barring
foreign RICO claims, these countries should seek the aid of the
United States government to bring their cases.
III. Conclusion
With roots reaching back to the eighteenth century, the
Revenue Rule has firmly situated itself in American jurisprudence.
Now over three centuries later, it has become entangled in a legal
battle with the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations
Act of 1970 (RICO). These two legal titans have battled in the
United States District Courts, United States Courts of Appeals, and
the Supreme Court. In theory, the Revenue Rule bars civil RICO
175

Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) (citing Moore v.
Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929)).
176
Id.
177
Id.
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claims by foreign countries denying them the remedies they seek
after falling victim to the wrongdoings of Americans.
Three hundred years after its development the Revenue
Rule has become obsolete. This common law rule no longer has a
place within American jurisprudence and should be released from
legal use.

With changing technology and the evolution of

instantaneous currency exchange, the Revenue Rule has lost its
standing in the legal world. Unfortunately, because of its survival
through centuries of legal history, some feel the Revenue Rule still
has a place in the court room. In this case, the Revenue Rule
should be restricted so as to never bar civil RICO claims brought
by foreign countries seeking justice in America. When American
citizens or companies commit crimes abroad, the ones offended
should be able to seek a remedy. By allowing RICO claims to
supersede the Revenue Rule, we allow justice to be served on the
very people RICO seeks to punish. As a last effort, if the Revenue
Rule cannot be abolished or restricted, foreign countries should
seek the assistance of the American government in bringing a case
in the United States against their aggressors. By bringing these
suits, the government can assure courts that any international
problems will be circumvented.

This also keeps courts from

invoking the Revenue Rule. With the United States bringing the
claim, there is no longer the issue of interpreting foreign revenue
laws. This solves any doubts courts may have in adjudicating these
types of cases. These options provide an ending to the ongoing
battle between the Revenue Rule and civil RICO.

